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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE
CPLR 203(f) now expressly defers to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code's four-year period for sales contracts. Before the
amendment, it also deferred, but under the more general terms
of CPLR 101. Problems can be expected when the courts are
asked to determine whether the contract involved is a sales contract
within the meaning of the UCC.
CPLR 204(a): No stay in action involving fire insurance policy.
CPLR 204(a) provides that where commencement of an
action has been stayed by a court or by statutory prohibition, the
statute of limitations is tolled for the duration of the stay. In
Proc v. Home Ins. Co.,'0 plaintiff's premises were insured by
standard fire insurance policies which provided that: (1) insured
must file proof of loss within sixty days of insurer's demand;"
(2) the claim would be payable sixty days after proof of loss ;12
and (3) no suit could be commenced unless all the requirements
of the policy were met and unless such action was commenced
within twelve months from the "inception of the loss."' 3 The
premises were partially destroyed by fire in November, 1962, but
plaintiff failed to commence his cause of action until February,
1964. He had filed proof-of-loss papers in May, 1963, two months
after the defendant's demand.
The plaintiff argued that since the insurer was allowed sixty
days after proof of loss within which to satisfy the claim, and since
Section 168(6) of the Insurance Law required that he comply
with all the terms of the contract before his cause of action accrued,
the commencement of the twelve-month period in which to bring
the action was tolled by CPLR 204(a) until the accrual of the
cause of action.
However, the Court of Appeals held that Section 168(6) of
the Insurance Law was not the type of statutory prohibition
contemplated by CPLR 204(a), and concluded that the statute
of limitations began running at the time of the fire and not at the
time the cause of action accrued.' 4 The Court stated that it would
not rewrite nearly ninety years of legislative history and subvert
the clear legislative intent "by deriving from the less specific terms
10 17 N.Y.2d 239, 217 N.E.2d 136, 270 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1966).
"1 N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 168(6), 172. Section 168(6) contains the standard
fire policy form which is required to be used within New York.
12 N.Y. INs. LAW § 168(6).
"3 Ibid.
14 For a case treating this legislation and its history, see Marguilies v.
Quaker City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 276 App. Div. 695, 97 N.Y.S.2d 100
(lst Dep't 1950).
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of another provision (CPLR 204, subd. [a]) just the opposite
intention and meaning."15
The present case should be contrasted with the prior case of
Creswell v. Doe.' Creswell involved Section 618(a) of the
Insurance Law. This section requires qualified persons to obtain
leave from the supreme court to sue MVAIC on a hit-and-run
automobile case. The appellate division held that the statute of
limitations was tolled from the date of the accident until the date
when leave to sue was granted. By distinguishing Proc from
Creswell, it appears that the Court of Appeals has relied on the
clear legislative pronouncements in the area of standard fire insur-
ance policies. It seems unlikely that similar preclusions of CPLR
204(a) will come about absent comparable legislative histories.
CPLR 206(a): Amendment.
CPLR 206(a) has been amended to include: "Except as pro-
vided in article 3 of the uniform commercial code." Section
3-122(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code states that a cause
of action against a drawer of a draft or an indorser of any instru-
ment accrues upon a demand following dishonor. Typically, such
demand takes the form of a notice of dishonor after the instrument
has been presented to and dishonored by the person designated
on the instrument to pay. Under the prior 206(a) provision, the
cause of action was computed from dishonor, not from demand.
CPLR 213(2): Amendment.
CPLR 213(2) has been amended to read that there will be a
six-year statute of limitations in any action upon a contractual
obligation or liability "except as provided in article 2 of the
uniform commercial code." Section 2-725 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code provides a four-year statute of limitations for
breach of a sales contract.
The amendment effects no change. CPLR 213(2) now ex-
pressly defers to the Uniform Commercial Code's four-year period
for sales contract cases. Before the amendment it also deferred,
but under the more general terms of CPLR 101. After the
Uniform Commercial Code is four years old, which will be on
September 27, 1968, the courts can expect a substantial number
of cases in which they will be asked to determine whether the
contract involved is a sales contract within the meaning of the
15 Proc v. Home Ins. Co., 17 N.Y2d 239, 245, 217 N.E.2d 136, 139,
270 N.Y.S.2d 412, 415 (1966).
1622 App. Div. 2d 942, 255 N.Y.S.2d 946 (2d Dep't 1964). The
appellate division, however, did not look at the legislative history behind
the wrongful death statute in rendering its decision.
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